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Abstract—Security is an important concern in today’s infor-
mation age and particularly so in satellite systems, where eaves-
dropping can be easily performed. This paper addresses efficient
key management for encrypted multicast traffic transmitted via
satellite.
We consider the topic of encrypting traffic in large multicast
groups, where the group size and dynamics have a significant im-
pact on the network load. We consider life cycle key management
costs of a multicast connection, and show for a logical key hier-
archy (LKH) how member preregistration and periodic admission
reduces the initialization cost, and how the optimum outdegree of
a hierarchical tree varies with the expected member volatility and
rekey factor. This improves network utilization, but encryption at
the network layer can pose problems on satellite links. We, there-
fore, propose and analyze an interworking solution between mul-
tilayer Internet protocol security (IPSEC) and LKH that also re-
duces key management traffic while enabling interworking with
performance enhancing modules used on satellite links.
Index Terms—Logical key hierarchy (LKH), multicast, multi-
layer Internet protocol security (IPSEC), performance-enhancing
modules (PEMs), performance-enhancing proxies (PEPs).
I. INTRODUCTION
SATELLITE-BASED broadband Internet protocol (IP) net-works have the potential to deliver multicast services cost
effectively. However, satellites present some significant security
challenges.
• Eavesdropping and active intrusion are much easier than in
terrestrial fixed or mobile networks because of the broad-
cast nature of satellites.
• Satellite systems are resource-constrained, particularly in
the areas of limited transmission power (and, thus, channel
capacity), and limited processing and switching capability
for satellites with on-board processing.
• Satellite channels experience high bit-error rates, which
can result in packet loss and the loss of security synchro-
nization.
Security systems for satellite data, thus, have to be optimized
to take account of these limitations, in particular the need for
confidentiality and the requirement to use satellite resources ef-
ficiently. Geostationary satellites also suffer from a long prop-
agation delay, and security systems must, therefore, add only
minimal delays to traffic.
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In this paper, we consider scalability of multicast security ser-
vices, focusing on issues surrounding confidentiality on satel-
lite links, while minimizing satellite resource usage. A partic-
ular issue in securing multicast connections is that of key man-
agement; this needs to scale effectively, particularly given the
large number of multicast recipients (potentially of the order of
millions) that are expected in satellite networks. A number of
scalable approaches have been proposed, and one in particular,
logical key hierarchy (LKH) is analyzed in detail in this paper.
Performance-enhancing modules (PEMs) are used to enhance
performance on satellite links. One type of PEM is a perfor-
mance-enhancing proxy (PEP) [6], which can be used to im-
prove the performance of protocols on network paths such as
satellites or wireless links, where native performance suffers
due to the characteristics of the link or subnetwork. PEMs are
often considered in the context of unicast transmission control
protocol (TCP) traffic streams but are also applicable to mul-
ticast traffic. For example, an audio multicast stream may be
transmitted using real-time transport protocol (RTP) over user
datagram protocol (UDP): Since the data content of each packet
is small, the transmission efficiency can be increased by using
PEMs to compress the headers on the satellite link. Another ex-
ample is implementing forward error correction (FEC) mecha-
nisms in the PEMs to reduce the satellite link’s effective error
rate for a multicast channel. PEMs generally read and change
the content of the transport layer header and, thus, they can usu-
ally only be used when the transport header is not encrypted.
Thus, network layer security mechanisms, such as Internet pro-
tocol security (IPSEC), that encrypt the entire transport layer
packet are incompatible with the use of these PEMs in satel-
lite-based communications: IPSEC hides all details of higher
layer protocols and makes it impossible for any intermediate
node to process this information. Consequently, any service that
requires knowledge of the transport layer header content any-
where other than in the end host cannot function if IP packets
are encrypted.
A. Research Contributions
We consider key management, and in particular the life cycle
key distribution costs. We take account not only of the cost of
rekeying when users join or leave an established group, but we
also consider the costs of building a tree during initialization of
a multicast group. We show for LKH how user preregistration
and periodic admission reduces this initialization cost, and how
the optimum outdegree of a hierarchical tree varies with the ex-
pected user volatility and rekey factor. Other authors have shown
[22] that when a rekey occurs after each join or depart, a lower
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bound on the worst-case key update costs is a logarithmic vari-
ation with group membership . Our work, on the other hand,
whilst conforming to this logarithmic function, shows how the
optimum value of the tree outdegree varies with the expected
rekey frequency, taking into account both the cost of initially
building the tree and the cost of rekeying over the lifetime of the
multicast group. In [19], the optimum number of keys assigned
to each group member is related to the probability of deletion
of the individual member. Here, we assume each member is
equally likely to join or leave the group, giving a tree with equal
numbers of keys for each member.
As described above, PEMs can be incompatible with
end-to-end security systems and pose a particular problem
for satellite systems. Multilayer IPSEC has been proposed as
an approach that allows authorized network devices to access
packet headers, while retaining end-to-end privacy of the data
carried in the packets. In this paper, we propose and analyze an
interworking solution between multilayer IPSEC (ML-IPSEC)
and LKH and show how the key management traffic on satellite
links can be further reduced using this approach. Finally,
the impact of ML-IPSEC and LKH on the life cycle costs is
considered.
B. Outline of Paper
This paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews related
work in end-to-end satellite security and in key management for
multicast group security. In Section III, we briefly review the op-
eration of LKH in key management and present an analysis of
life cycle key distribution costs. In Section IV, we consider mul-
tilayer IPSEC and how it supports multicast security in satellite
systems. In Section V, we demonstrate how it can be combined
with LKH to provide efficient and secure key management.
II. RELATED WORK: MULTICAST KEY MANAGEMENT
The process of securing and performing key management for
unicast connections is well understood [8], [13], [18], but mul-
ticast security is more complex. In principle, a multicast con-
nection could be regarded from the security perspective as a set
of unicast connections, but this approach does not scale well for
large groups, especially at the scales expected in satellite sys-
tems. Protocols that manage the process of distributing keys in
a multicast environment are under development [2], [5], [9].
The principal actors in multicast key management are the
group controller (GC) and group members (GMs). The former
is responsible for creating and distributing keys and rekeying
(to maintain security) as appropriate; the latter are entities with
access to the group keys. The GC need not be colocated with
the multicast data source. Each GM has an initial one-to-one
secure association with the GC (using techniques such as
Diffie–Hellman to create a shared secret known only to the two
parties; or a preshared secret; or secret exchange using a public
key system [20]). These secure associations are then used to
create and share information about a group secure association
between the GC and all GMs. The ultimate aim of the group
secure association is to ensure that a single key, usually called
the group traffic encryption key (GTEK), is known to the GC
and all GMs and to no entity outside the group: This key can
then be used to encrypt the data multicast within the group.
The multicast group may need to be rekeyed for any of a
number of reasons.
1) The group key is usually updated regularly (typically
every few seconds or minutes) to reduce the probability
of successful cryptanalysis of the encrypted traffic.
2) The group key may also need to be changed on demand
if it is determined that the key has been compromised.
3) Rekeying may be required when a new member joins the
multicast group. This ensures that the member cannot de-
crypt encoded traffic sent prior to their joining (backward
secrecy).
4) Rekeying may be required when an existing member
departs from the multicast group. This ensures that the
member cannot decrypt encoded traffic sent after they
leave (forward secrecy).
For large multicast groups that have frequent membership
changes, the cost of rekeying can be significant, since satel-
lite resources are expensive. Scalable rekeying is, therefore, an
important problem that needs to be considered in order to sup-
port secure communications for large dynamic groups. We now
consider rekey techniques for each of the four functions listed
above.
Several techniques exist for rekeying 1) and 3): Two options
are for the new group key to be encrypted with either a) the old
group key or b) a separate “control” key negotiated during ses-
sion establishment. For 2) and 4), a different rekeying approach
is required since the old key is known by at least one user who
is no longer to be a recipient of the multicast transmission. We
now consider options for this rekeying.
A number of multicast key management approaches have
been developed with the objective of improving the scalability
of group secure associations by ensuring that parameters grow
more slowly than the group size . Parameters considered in-
clude GC encryption effort and memory requirements, network
traffic, and GMs’ decryption effort and memory requirements.
Key management techniques include a flat system, Iolus [14],
LKH [23], [24], and Kronos [21].
In the simplest approach, a flat system, the GC shares a
unique key with each individual GM. The GTEK can then be
sent to the members by encrypting it times with each of the
unique keys. Thus, both the GC key encryption load and the
rekey traffic increase linearly with . It should be noted that
for this flat system the broadcast nature of a satellite does not
provide any benefit compared with a terrestrial network, since
the encrypted messages sent to the GMs are all different.
In Iolus [14], a multicast group is partitioned into several sub-
groups. The GC manages a tree of group subcontrollers, each
of which manages a subset of the group membership. The ad-
vantage of this mechanism is that the rekey effort is shared be-
tween the subcontrollers, but the drawbacks of this approach are
the large number of subcontrollers required in large groups, the
need to trust the subcontrollers, and the delay caused by the need
to rekey traffic as it passes through each subcontroller.
LKH, described in more detail below, uses a set of keys ar-
ranged in a tree structure to reduce the cost of rekeying. For a
fully populated tree of outdegree and depth , the number of
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Fig. 1. Key hierarchies. (a) N pairwise keys. (b) Hierarchical tree.
rekeys transmitted on a member compromise is ;
this compares favorably with the cost of for a flat
system. The system is also robust against collusion, in that no
set of users together can read any message unless one of them
could have read it individually. Improvements to LKH for the
specific case of binary trees have also been proposed
in one-way function trees [4], [15], and by [7]: Both these ap-
proaches reduce the number of rekeys required in the event of
compromise of a user from to .
Kronos is a further approach to reducing rekey traffic in large
dynamic multicast groups. This approach recognizes that if two
users depart and cause two rekey events to occur, some of the
keys that change will be common to the two rekey events. Rekey
traffic can, therefore, be saved by bundling changes together and
rekeying, perhaps every few seconds.
III. LKH LIFE CYCLE COSTS
A. Description
Before analyzing LKH in detail, we initially briefly re-
view the simple flat key management system. Consider
pairwise keys each shared between the GC and one of the
GMs [Fig. 1(a)]: This represents the flat system described in
Section II. The pairwise keys are represented by the circles,
and the group key is represented by the box labeled “A.” If the
group key is changed, the new group key has to be encrypted
with each member’s unique pairwise key and then sent to that
member; each of these encrypted keys is represented by one
of the lines drawn in Fig. 1(a). Thus, for members, a total
of encrypted keys are generated and transmitted across the
satellite network. In this case, the key management network
traffic volume is independent of whether the keys are unicast,
multicast, or broadcast (although for good security the keys
should be transmitted to as few entities as feasible).
We contrast this with LKH, where a tree of keys is used.
The tree is logical and does not have any mapping onto a phys-
ical network layout: The only physical entities remain the GC
and the GMs, and LKH is highly suited to satellite systems. In
Fig. 1(b), the keys are labeled A through O, each circle again
represents a member’s pairwise key, and the lines each repre-
sent encrypted keys sent across the network, as we shall now see.
Each member holds the keys on the tree path from the member’s
pairwise key (at a tree leaf) back to the root. Suppose now that
member 11 needs to be deleted from the multicast group. Then,
all of the keys held by member 11 (keys F, K, N, O) must be
changed and distributed to the members who need them, without
permitting member 11 or other unauthorized entities to obtain
them. To do this, we must replace the keys held by member 11,
proceeding from the bottom up.
The GC chooses a new key for the lowest node (not the leaf,
for which a unicast secure association exists between the GC
and the GM) and then transmits it encrypted with the appropriate
child keys. Thus, for this example, the first key replaced is key
F and this new key will be sent encrypted with member 12’s
unique pairwise key. The second key replaced is key K, which
is sent encrypted with the newly replaced key F (for member
12) and also sent encrypted with key E (for members 9 and 10).
Key N is then sent encrypted with the newly replaced key K (for
members 9, 10, and 12) and also encrypted with key L (shared
by members 13–16). Finally, key O is replaced, and this new key
is sent encrypted with the newly replaced key N (for members
9, 10, and 12–16) and also separately is encrypted with key M
(shared by members 1–8). Since we are proceeding from the
bottom up, each of the replacement keys will have been replaced
before it is used to encrypt another key. The encrypted keys
need to be multicast or broadcast (noting that as above, for good
security the keys should only be transmitted within the group),
and those keys that are encrypted with pairwise keys may be
unicast.
The seven keys sent represent a significant saving on the 16
keys that would need to be transmitted using the flat key system
of Fig. 1(a). In general, the number of transmissions required is
the sum of the degrees of the replaced nodes. In a fully populated
-ary tree in which a GM sits at depth , this is a total of
transmissions.
The GTEK, used to encrypt data traffic, may, depending on
the group security policy, either be key O [Fig. 1(b)], or it may
be separately encrypted using key O and transmitted to all GMs.
In the analysis that follows, we adopt the former approach and
choose not to include the GTEK in the rekey count.
B. Life Cycle Costs
There is an implicit assumption in the LKH literature that user
join/leave rekeying is the principal cost of key management,
with tree initialization costs being negligible. However, applica-
tions exist (such as file transfer), where the user population has a
low volatility and, therefore, the tree initialization costs become
significant. Also, and distinctly, there may be some multicast
groups (e.g., pay-per-view) where subscribers join the group at
Authorized licensed use limited to: University of Surrey. Downloaded on February 18,2010 at 10:53:46 EST from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply. 
HOWARTH et al.: DYNAMICS OF KEY MANAGEMENT IN SECURE SATELLITE MULTICAST 311
Key 
hierarchy 
DYNAMIC TREE: example join costs (for k=d=3) 
Member number: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 25 26 27 
Perfect memory: 1 1 1 3 1 1 2 1 1 4 1 1 2 1 1 
Tr’mit keys as required:1 1 1 3 2 2 2 2 2 4 3 3 3 3 3 
Perfect backward sec: 1 2 3 3 4 5 4 5 6 4 5 6 7 8 9 
DYNAMIC TREE: generic tree of outdegree k and depth d 
Member number: 1 2 ..  k k+1 k+2 .. 2k  .. k2 k2+1 ..  kd-k+1 .. kd 
Perfect memory: 1 1 ..  1 3 1 1  .. 1 4 ..  2 .. 1 
Tr’mit keys as required:1 1 ..  1 3 2 2  .. 2 4 ..  d .. d 
Perfect backward sec: 1 2 ..  k 3 4 ..2+k  .. 2k 4 ..  kd-k+1 ..  kd 
M 
K J L 
B A C D I 
Group key 
Members 
. . . 
. . . 
. . . 
. . . 
STATIC TREE: generic tree of outdegree k and depth d 
Member number: 1 2 ..  k k+1 k+2 .. 2k  .. k2 k2+1 ..  kd-k+1 .. kd 
Perfect memory: d 1 ..  1 2 1 1  .. 1 3 ..  2 .. 1 
Tr’mit keys as required:d d ..  d d d d  .. d d ..  d .. d 
Perfect backward sec: d d+1..d+k-1  d+1 ..   ..d+2k-2 4 ..  kd-k+1 .. kd 
STATIC TREE: example join costs (for k=d=3) 
Member number: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 25 26 27 
Perfect memory: 3 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 3 1 1 2 1 1 
Tr’mit keys as required:3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Perfect backward sec: 3 4 5 4 5 6 5 6 7 4 5 6 7 8 9 
. . . 
. . . 
. . . 
. . . 
. . . 
. . . 
. . . 
. . . 
. . . 
. . . 
. . . 
. . . 
. . . 
. . . 
 
Fig. 2. Tree initialization approaches.
around the same time, with a high demand on the establishment
of the group secure association.
For our analysis, we divide the life cycle of a secure group
connection into the following phases.
• Initialization: Members are authenticated to the GC and
are issued with keys, including the group key used to en-
crypt data.
• Data transfer: This comprises two rekey activities:
• The GTEK is updated regularly to reduce the prob-
ability of successful cryptanalysis of ciphertext;
• Rekeying occurs when members join or depart to
ensure perfect backward or forward secrecy, respec-
tively, or when a key or member is compromised.
• Termination: Once the data transfer is complete the secure
connection ends. We assume that the keys are simply dis-
carded, since they are of no further use.
We assume in this analysis that the entire LKH tree is popu-
lated during the initialization phase, that once the initialization
phase is complete the LKH tree remains balanced [16], and that
it remains nearly full as members join and depart.
C. Analysis
As each GM joins a group the member is authenticated and
a pairwise key for secure communication with the GC is estab-
lished using a mechanism that in line with current approaches
[9] is out of scope of this work. Our metric is the number of en-
crypted keys transmitted by the source: Ignoring protocol over-
heads, this is proportional to the key network traffic. For secure
multicast over satellite, where resources are limited, it is partic-
ularly important to minimize the key management traffic costs.
We now consider the initialization cost. Three approaches are
considered, in increasing order of cost, with generic cases and
numerical examples being shown in Fig. 2. For each of the three
approaches we may either consider a static tree, in which the
tree depth is assumed fixed in advance, or we may consider
a dynamic tree, in which the tree depth grows as the number of
members increases, the depth being one when there are not more
than members, two when the number of members lies in the
range to inclusive, and so forth. The initialization costs
for each of the three approaches are as follows.
Case 1) Assume each receiver has perfect memory: Once a
given key has been transmitted, any receiver that is
given the encoding key (even at a later time) can
decrypt the encoded key. Although this assumption
is not expected to be valid in practice, it provides
a useful comparison in this analysis since it has the
lowest initialization cost. As will be seen later, it also
corresponds to a useful category of tree building.
It is shown in Appendix A that for both static and
dynamic trees, the total number of keys transmitted
to admit users to the group is
(1)
Case 2) Transmit all the keys needed by a receiver at the
time the receiver joins the group. Users do not
require memory of previous transmissions and may
even be switched off prior to joining the group.
Keys are, therefore, in general, transmitted multiple
times, when different users require them. In this
case, the total number of keys transmitted to admit
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members to the group is with
the exact expressions for static and dynamic trees,
respectively, being (Appendix A)
(2)
(3)
Case 3) Rekey on each join: This ensures perfect backward
secrecy is maintained as the tree is initialized. To en-
sure perfect backward secrecy as each member joins
the group, not only must the group key be changed,
but also, the keys that enable the joining receiver to
decrypt ancestor keys must also be changed: If this is
not done, then a newly joined receiver with memory
could obtain the previous group key and, therefore,
decrypt transmissions that occurred prior to the user
joining the group. The total number of keys trans-
mitted to admit users is also , with
the expressions for static and dynamic trees being
(Appendix A)
(4)
(5)
D. Implications
The perfect memory approach has the lowest tree initializa-
tion cost. It also corresponds to a useful way of building a mul-
ticast tree: consider a multicast session that is advertised [per-
haps using the session announcement protocol (SAP)] and for
which potential members are invited (or required) to register in
advance. Then, at the time the session is due to start the source
knows the number of members and builds the tree in the fol-
lowing order: All lowest level keys ( , Fig. 2) are sent
encrypted with each recipient’s pairwise key, then the second
level keys ( , Fig. 2), and so on up the tree. Each receiver
can decrypt each key as it is received and the tree initialization
cost (1) is .
The second approach corresponds to members arriving inter-
mittently. In this case, the source cannot assume that a newly
joining receiver has any key information, and all the keys re-
quired by each receiver have to be transmitted with the initial-
ization cost being .
The cost [(2), (3)] can, however, be reduced if joining re-
ceivers are grouped together (perhaps every few seconds) so that
keys can be transmitted together. For example, if (Fig. 2) mem-
bers 25 and 26 join separately, six keys are sent. However, if
they join simultaneously only four keys are sent. This is similar
to periodic rekeying [21], and since here we are predominantly
initializing new users, the required set of keys will be highly
correlated, and so significant savings can be realized. The sav-
ings for periodic rekeying have been quantified by [25].
E. Volatility
We now consider the life cycle cost of the group connection,
which we define in this section as the sum of the cost of ini-
tializing the LKH tree and the cost of rekeying during the data
transfer phase when GMs join or depart. We further define the
volatility as the mean number of rekeys per GM. Thus, a value
of means that on average there is one rekey operation
per GM during the lifetime of the secure transmission. The cost
of each such rekey is when a GM departs
or when a GM joins: these functions have a
minimum value at (noting that can only take integer
values). However, when we include both the initialization and
rekey costs, the optimum value of that gives a minimum life
cycle cost is different. For each initialization approach, the life
cycle cost for static trees is
(6)
(7)
To ensure perfect backward secrecy, we include the rekey cost
on a user join . Assuming equal number of joins and
departs
(8)
We differentiate these expressions (Appendix A) and use
Newton–Raphson iteration to find the minimum cost as a
function of for a given . Fig. 3 shows each cost as a function
of for dynamic trees and static trees. To illustrate the effect of
optimizing , curves are drawn both for a tree of fixed outdegree
and for the case when the tree outdegree is optimized for
the given volatility. Fig. 4 shows what this optimum value of
is for each value of volatility . Fig. 5 shows how the total cost
varies as a function of for two example values of .
We observe the following.
• Preregistration has the lowest cost.
• The intermittent arrival cost can be reduced significantly
at low volatility by optimizing (the optimum values are
at 10 and at 10 for 10
to 10 , Fig. 4).
• Backward secrecy has the highest cost.
• The life cycle costs are almost identical for static and dy-
namic trees (static trees are, therefore, used for Figs. 4 and
5).
• At low volatility, there are significant cost differences be-
tween the optimum value of and the conventional value
or , for case 1 (perfect memory receivers)
and case 2 (transmit keys at the time the receiver joins the
group) (Fig. 3).
• For frequent rekeying , the curves converge and
the cost is independent of the initialization approach.
An example, low volatility population is a corporate video-
conference transmitted to employees, who might be expected
not to leave the conference frequently. A significant example
of zero volatility is a file transfer: It is not meaningful to
leave and rejoin since this will result in data loss. In this
case, the volatility and the optimum key hierarchy
is flat. Indeed, at low volatility the Case 1 preregistration
perfect memory receivers and Case 2 intermittent
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arrival curves with optimized converge to the same cost
(Fig. 3).
F. Group Key Update
The life cycle cost can also be considered taking into account
rekeying to prevent cryptanalysis. In this section, we therefore
redefine the life cycle cost as the sum of the cost of initializing
the LKH tree and the cost of regular GTEK updates during the
data transfer phase. Let the lifetime of the group be , and let
the group update period be . Then, the total number of changes
of the group key over the life of the group is . If each new
group key is encrypted with each of its children and then mul-
ticast (e.g., , Fig. 2), the total number of
keys transmitted due to group key updates is . We define a
normalized rekey factor ; thus, a group of 10 users
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.
Fig. 7. Optimum value of tree outdegree k as function of rekey factor .
with a lifetime of 3 h and group key update period of 10 s has a
10 . The life cycle costs are then, for example, for perfect
memory/preregistration
(9)
which has a minimum with respect to when .
The life cycle costs are shown as a function of for static trees
in Fig. 6, and the optimum value of as a function of is shown
in Fig. 7. We note the following.
• At low , when the number of rekeys per GM is low, the
optimum value of is .
• At high , rekeying to prevent cryptanalysis predominates
over tree build costs, and so the optimum value of is
(noting that it is not meaningful for to be less
than 2).
IV. ML-IPSEC
The analysis of Section III shows how the network rekey
traffic can be optimized, but when we consider multicast on
satellite links, the use of traffic encryption at the network layer
can be incompatible with PEMs. We, therefore, now proceed
to consider a mechanism that permits network layer traffic
encryption with satellite PEMs. In this section, we describe
ML-IPSEC and show how it supports multicast security over
satellites while providing enhanced utilization of the satellite
resources. In Section V, we go on to illustrate a solution that
provides interworking between ML-IPSEC and LKH, while
further reducing the key management traffic.
A. IPSEC
The IP security architecture IPSEC provides standardized In-
ternet security at the IP layer [10] and supports interoperable
cryptographically based security services (i.e., confidentiality,
authentication, integrity, and nonrepudiation). It consists of an
authentication protocol, authentication header (AH) [11]; a con-
fidentiality protocol encapsulated security payload (ESP) [12];
it also includes an Internet security association establishment
and key management protocol (ISAKMP) [13]. These security
protocols are designed for both IP version 4 (IPv4) and IP ver-
sion 6 (IPv6) environments.
IPSEC supports two modes: transport and tunnel. In transport
mode, the IP header is transmitted in clear, and the IP data is
encrypted. Network devices can, therefore, process the IP data-
gram. In tunnel mode, the entire datagram (header and payload)
are encrypted and a new IP header is prefixed to the datagram.
In either mode, the transport layer header is encrypted. This,
therefore, includes transport headers that contain information
needed in the case of satellite gateways to perform performance
enhancing or other intelligent routing functions.
The transport layer may be either unicast (TCP or UDP) or
multicast or reliable multicast. Some basic rules for TCP opti-
mization techniques used in satellite communications and the
implications they might have for IPSEC have been pointed out
in [17]. However, if the optimization techniques involve inter-
mediate routers or gateways and these require read or write ac-
cess to the transport layer header or encapsulated data, IPSEC
cannot be used without some kind of adaptation.
B. ML-IPSEC
Work on ML-IPSEC has been carried out for example by
Hughes Network Systems [26]. It has also been considered for
mobile networks [3], and optimization of multicast over satel-
lites is still a research issue. ML-IPSEC defines a security rela-
tionship that involves not only the sender and the receiver of a
security service but selected intermediate nodes along the traffic
stream as well. The IP datagram is divided into several zones
and different protection schemes are applied to each zone (illus-
trated in Fig. 8 for IPSEC transport mode). Individual security
relationships can be used to cover each zone of the IP datagram
and then build a new type of secure association (SA) called a
composite SA (CSA). Thus, in Fig. 8, the transport data is en-
crypted using key K2, while the transport header is encrypted
using key K1.
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C. ML-IPSEC for Satellites
Fig. 9 illustrates the use of ML-IPSEC in a satellite environ-
ment [1]. For simplicity, the analysis is initially illustrated here
in terms of a secure unicast connection. For multicast, the anal-
ysis is identical, although there are potentially many downlink
gateways. A user in network A wishes to establish a secure link
with a node in network B. End-user security module A estab-
lishes secure associations with end-user security module B and
also with the satellite security gateways X and Y. When user
A sends an IP datagram, it is encrypted using key K1 to en-
crypt the transport header and key K2 to encrypt the transport
content. On receipt by the uplink terminal the transport header
only is decrypted by security gateway X, any performance en-
hancing functions such as header compression or spoofing are
performed, and the transport header is re-encrypted. The data-
gram is then transmitted over the satellite link, where security
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Fig. 10. ML-IPSEC trust relationships.
is assured by the encryption. At the satellite downlink (security
gateway Y), the transport header can be decrypted using K1,
and any performance enhancing functions can be performed.
The header is re-encrypted by security gateway Y using K1 and
forwarded. The datagram is fully secured in transit over the un-
trusted network B. At end user B, the datagram is decrypted
using both K1 and K2.
In summary, it can be seen that the security entities at the
ends of a connection (i.e., at the source A and at each destina-
tion B of a multicast transmission) need both group keys K1 and
K2. However, intermediate security gateways that are respon-
sible for performance-enhancing functions only need access to
group key K1 to enable them to read and if necessary change
the transport header.
This approach raises issues of trust, since there are two dif-
ferent entities which have access to common information. The
security gateway and PEM are both part of the satellite terminal
and, thus, under the control of the satellite terminal operator
(Fig. 10); the end-user security module, on the other hand, is
part of the end user terminal or application and is controlled
by the end user. The security gateway needs access to key K1
and the end user(s) need access to keys K1 and K2. In order to
achieve this, both the satellite terminal operator and the end user
need to trust a secure third party (the security server shown in
Fig. 10). The trusted third party is responsible for generating and
distributing the keys and this forms the basis for the end-to-end
security between users. The model also implies a limited trust
between the user and the satellite terminal operator, where the
latter is trusted to have access to the transport headers.
V. ML-IPSEC AND LKH INTERWORKING
A. Analysis
We now present an extension of LKH as discussed in
Section III that provides an efficient and scalable key manage-
ment system for multicast ML-IPSEC. The two group keys K1
and K2 could be managed using two separate LKH trees, but a
saving can be made by integrating them into a single hierarchy
as follows. Fig. 11 shows the proposed key hierarchy for a
set of users U1 to U9 and a set of intermediate gateways G1
to G4. All users and intermediate gateways are members of
the multicast group. In this illustration, the nine users are in a
subtree of outdegree , and the four gateways are in a
subtree of outdegree . The root (key H) has two children,
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Fig. 11. Integrated LKH tree for ML-IPSEC.
irrespective of the values of and . As in Section III, Keys
K1 and K2 could either be the LKH keys H and D shown in
Fig. 11, or they could be separate keys encrypted using H and
D, respectively, and transmitted to members. The group key K1
used to encrypt the transport layer header is at the root of the
tree and the group key K2 used to encrypt the data is one of the
root’s two child keys. Recalling that in LKH each member only
knows the keys that lie on the path from the member’s leaf node
to the root, it can be seen that users have access to both K1 and
K2, while gateways only have access to key K1. In the event of
a gateway compromise, as part of the normal LKH rekeying we
transmit , and so, users can still decrypt the transport
header. For the users located behind the compromised gateway,
it is assumed that a protection path exists via one of the other
gateways so that they can still receive the multicast traffic.
If there are users and intermediate gateways, then the
cost of rekeying for this single integrated tree is as follows. For
a user depart, assuming a fully populated tree, the rekey cost in
keys is
(10)
For a gateway depart, the rekey cost is
(11)
This compares with rekey costs for two separate trees
(Fig. 12) as follows. The combined LKH tree for key K1 has
members; let its outdegree be . The LKH
tree for K2 has members, and we assume its outdegree to
remain at . Then, for a user depart, the rekey cost to rekey
both keys K1 and K2 is
(12)
and for a gateway depart, the rekey cost is (to rekey K1 only)
(13)
B. Implications
The rekey costs on a user departure and a gateway departure
are shown, respectively, in Figs. 13 and 14. These show that
for a user rekey, the rekey cost is almost halved for values of
and is reduced still further in the unlikely event
that the number of gateways exceeds the number of users. For
a gateway departure, the integrated LKH saving compared with
     U1   U2   U3    U4   U5   U6    U7   U8   U9   G1  G2  G3    G4  
Key 
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Fig. 12. Separate LKH trees for transport header and data.
Fig. 13. ML-IPSEC and LKH interworking: Rekey costs on user depart.
Fig. 14. ML-IPSEC and LKH interworking: Rekey costs on gateway depart.
the separate LKH rekey cost is particularly high for ,
that is, when there are a relatively small number of gateways.
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Fig. 15. ML-IPSEC and LKH: Life cycle cost as function of rekey factor .
The gateways would normally be expected to be less volatile
than the users. In this case, the optimum outdegree of the
user subtree may be selected using the analysis described in
Section III using the outdegree of the user subtree, .
Rekeying to update the group key can either change just the
transport data key K2, or it can involve changing both K1 and
K2. In the former case, the analysis of Section III and the life
cycle rekey costs given in Fig. 6 are applicable for a tree of
users and outdegree . In the latter case, the number of keys
transmitted for each rekey is , and the life cycle cost is
illustrated in Fig. 15.
VI. CONCLUSION
Satellite-based network services present significant security
issues, in particular the requirement for privacy and the need to
use satellite resources efficiently. This paper makes two distinct
contributions to this area for multicast services.
In the first contribution, we have considered life cycle key
costs in multicast groups that use LKH for key management.
We have shown how preregistration can reduce the hierarchical
tree initialization cost. When preregistration is not feasible, pe-
riodic admission can reduce this cost. For applications with low
volatility , where the fraction of users joining and leaving the
group over the connection lifetime is low, there is an optimum
tree outdegree that varies with the volatility and gives the min-
imum life cycle key cost. Similarly, the optimum tree outdegree
varies with the rekey factor that reflects the number of group
key updates. This analysis, therefore, minimizes the key man-
agement traffic demand on the satellite; it is also of general ap-
plication to terrestrial networks. We have motivated our analysis
with low-volatility application examples such as file transfer and
videoconferences.
In the second contribution, we have presented an inter-
working solution between ML-IPSEC and LKH that supports
the implementation of PEMs for satellites. In the proposed
approach, the end users are placed in one branch of the LKH
tree, and the satellite terminals or gateways are located in
another branch. The root key in the LKH tree can be used
for securing the transport header and a branch key acts as
GTEK and secures the data content for the end users. The
proposed scheme is scalable, in that the rekey effort varies with
, and efficient, in that for user departures the number of
rekeys required is in the region of half that of two separate tree
hierarchies.
APPENDIX A
LKH TREE BUILDING COSTS
A. Perfect Memory Receivers
For perfect memory receivers, each edge on the tree is trans-
mitted once only. The number of keys is, therefore, independent
of whether the tree has been built statically or dynamically, and
for a fully populated tree, the total number of keys transmitted
to admit users to the group is, therefore
If the life cycle cost is given by , where is
the rekey cost , and is the volatility, then the
minimum cost occurs when ; assuming ,
this occurs at
B. Transmit Keys Required for Each Receiver
For a static tree, each joining receiver requires keys to be
transmitted, and the total number of keys transmitted is simply
The life cycle cost has a minimum
when , which occurs when
We next consider a dynamic tree. The first users are as-
signed to a tree of depth 1, with group key A (Fig. 2), and so
they join at a cost of 1 key each. User , however, requires
the tree depth to increase to 2 with group key J (Fig. 2) and joins
at a cost of three keys: , and . When user
joins, we assume it does not have (because it did
not save this message when it was transmitted, or because it was
switched off) and, therefore, is now transmitted a second
time, giving a cost of two keys. Users through to are
also added at cost of two keys each. In general, the cost of adding
users through is ,
and so the total number of keys transmitted to admit users is
which simplifies to
Assuming , the minimum life cycle cost
occurs at
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C. Rekey on Each Join (Perfect Backward Secrecy)
In rekeying, we assume that each changed key is transmitted
times encrypted with each of its child keys.
For a static tree the first receivers join at a total cost (Fig. 2)
of keys, and the first receivers (1
through ) join at a total cost of
. By induction, the total cost of tree initialization
is
The minimum life cycle cost ,
where occurs at , i.e.,
The initialization cost for a dynamic tree is as follows. The
first user joins at a cost of one key; when the second user joins,
the group key is changed and is transmitted to both users at
a cost of two keys. This continues until user joins at a cost of
keys. User +1 requires a new group key to be created and
joins at a cost of three keys: , and . User
requires both and to be changed, and four keys are
sent: , and . The number of keys
transmitted to initialize users sums to
which simplifies to
Assuming , the minimum life cycle cost
occurs at
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